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What Happens if Pensions Disappear? A Case Analysis* 
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Purdue University Calumet 
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ABSTRACT 
Long before General Motors filed for bankruptcy protection, it closed all 
10 of its facilities in Anderson, Indiana, which was devastating to the 
greater Anderson Community, yet today, more than ten thousand General 
Motors retirees reside around Anderson and the pension benefits continue 
to buffer the economic impact on the community. There are viable threats 
in the current economic climate to this stream of pension income, 
however. 
This study is an attempt to assess the long-term economic impact that a 
loss or significant reduction of future pensions could potentially have on 
the Anderson, Indiana, area.  
KEY WORDS  Economic Impact; General Motors; Anderson, Indiana;  
Pension Benefits; Plant Closings 
In the latter half of the 20th century, Anderson, Indiana, was a prosperous factory town. 
The prosperity was largely due to the success of General Motors (GM) Corporation, the 
major employer in Anderson and the surrounding area, and of the many related 
companies that supplied General Motors, such as Guide Lamps, which produced 
headlamps, and Delco-Remy, which supplied batteries and electronic components. 
Anderson is located in Central Indiana, northeast of Indianapolis, and has a long, rich 
history in the automotive industry. Over the years, 17 brands of autos have been 
manufactured in Anderson. 
At its peak in the late 1970s, GM had 10 factories employing more than 22,000 
workers from Anderson (Peters and Maynard 2006). In fact, one out of every two people 
living in Anderson was employed as a GM worker (Peters and Maynard 2006). As one 
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resident reflected, “General Motors once had so many plants here that it had to stagger 
their schedules so that the streets would not be clogged with traffic when the workday 
ended” (Peters and Maynard 2006). During this time, only Flint, Michigan, was ranked 
higher than Anderson in largest concentration of GM operations (Chapman 2009).  
All of those GM plants are now closed, however, the last closing around 2006. 
The impact on the community was dramatic, and the population declined from a peak 
population of 70,787 in 1970 to the current population of 55,554 in 2012 (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2014). In addition to the loss of residents, the closures resulted in a rather 
immediate loss of income and benefits to employees, tax revenues from employees and 
companies, and incomes extracted from employee and company purchases. 
In 1974, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted to 
protect employee rights pertaining to pension plans. Under Title VII of ERISA, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was created as a federally chartered 
government corporation designed to protect retirement benefits of participants in 
qualified single-employer as well as multi-employer defined benefit (DB) plans (Lucas 
and Furdek 2008). In 2012, the PBGC guaranteed payments of pension plans for more 
than 44 million American workers and retirees in more than 26,000 private-sector DB 
plans [Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) 2013]. 
According to the EBRI (2013), for single-employer plans, 32.5 million 
participants were insured under 24,200 plans, with total assets held of $83 billion for the 
fiscal year ending September 30, 2012. For multi-employer plans, 10.4 million 
participants were insured under 1,450 plans, with total assets held of $1.8 billion for the 
fiscal year ending September 30, 2012. It is interesting to note that the net fiscal position 
of single-employer plans was a deficit of $29 billion and for multi-employer plans, a 
deficit of $5,237 million for the fiscal year 2012. 
The guarantee of “basic pension benefits” by the PBGC includes pension benefits at 
normal retirement age, most early retirement benefits, disability benefits, and annuity 
benefits for survivors of plan participants (PBGC N.d.). According to a recent EBRI report 
(Banerjee 2013), for all age groups above 65, Social Security remained the primary source 
of income while income from pensions and annuities was the second largest source of 
income. Additionally, households aged 65–74 received 17.1 percent and households above 
age 85 received 15.3 percent of their incomes from pensions and annuities.  
The greater Anderson area is not dependent on GM as a producer but rather “is 
dependent on GM, the welfare state” (Furdek and Lucas 2013). In essence, the GM 
retirees are solely dependent on the pensions and medical plans that they were given 
when they retired from GM. An important question that remains is what will happen to 
the pensions and medical plans after GM emerges from chapter 11 bankruptcy.  
With General Motors filing a chapter 11 bankruptcy, the company continued to 
manufacture automobiles, under court protection, while resolving its financial difficulties. 
Keep in mind that a chapter 11 bankruptcy may or may not affect retirees’ pensions or 
health plans. As a general rule, the promised pension should not be at risk, as the pension 
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assets should be adequately funded as required by federal law and the retirement assets 
should therefore be protected from the company’s creditors under a chapter 11 
bankruptcy (U.S. Department of Labor N.d.).  
If a company decides to terminate its pension plans, two methods can be used. 
One method is the standard termination. With this method, the employer ends the pension 
plan and has enough money to pay the plan participants either by purchasing an annuity 
from an insurance company or by issuing a lump-sum payment to cover the entire benefit 
(EBRI 2014). The other method is a distress termination, in which the company is in 
financial distress and the pension plan does not have enough money to cover all the 
pension benefits owed to plan participants (EBRI 2014). In other words, the company 
demonstrates to the bankruptcy court or to the PBGC that it cannot remain in business 
unless its pension plan is terminated. Under conditions of a distress termination, the 
PBGC has the authority to initiate the necessary action to terminate a pension plan in 
order to protect the interests of the plan participants. 
If the PBGC takes over as the trustee of the pension plan, it will review the plan records 
and determine the amount of benefit that each plan participant will receive. The amount paid to 
each participant is subject to limits set by federal law. For 2013, the maximum amount 
guaranteed was $4,789.77 per month, or $57,477.24 per year (EBRI 2014). 
THE MODEL AND ITS ASSUMPTIONS 
The model employed in this paper to estimate the impact over time of the stream of 
pension benefits was developed in an earlier study (Furdek and Lucas 2013). In this 
application, the loss of any of these benefits rather than the contribution from these 
benefits will be examined. 
The City of Anderson estimates that 10,000 retirees continue to reside in 
Anderson, while the regional autoworkers’ union estimates approximately 14,000 
retirees. This estimate is likely for the Anderson statistical metropolitan area (SMA) or 
even of the union’s service region, which includes the Indianapolis metropolitan area. 
Estimating the Number at Each Age 
By 2014, the GM retirees who remained in Anderson, Indiana, had been retired or 
eligible to retire for more than 10 years. Based on 2010 U.S. Census data for Anderson, 
the percentage of population in Anderson in the age groups 60 through 64, 65 through 69, 
70 through 74, 75 through 79, 80 through 84, 85 through 89, and 90 years and older was 
determined (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Those retirees who would have been eligible for 
retirement benefits when the plants closed and survived are likely in these age groups. 
The proportions of the population in each age group were applied to the estimated 10,000 
to 14,000 retirees in Anderson in 2012.  
The components of the model are worth reiterating. Mortality probabilities and, 
more importantly, survival probabilities for Anderson, Indiana, were derived from the 
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mortality probabilities estimated by the U.S. Social Security Administration (2012). 
These tables provide survival probabilities for males and females for each of these 
broad age categories. The data from the United Autoworkers’ Labor Union indicate that 
74% of autoworkers in Indiana are male and 26% are female. A weighted average of 
the survival factors for each age group was calculated to estimate the gender-combined 
survival factors.  
The data was refined for each year, rather than for five-year categories. With the 
proportion of retirees estimated for each age category, the number at each age was 
estimated by the following: 
Let Si be the survival factor for a person of age i and Nj be the number of retirees 
in a particular age group. Then Ni = X + (S60*X) + (S60*S61*X) + (S60*S61*S62*X) + 
(S60*S61*S62*S63*X), where X will be the number of retirees in the first year of that age 
group, so X = N/[1 + S1 + (S1*S2) + (S1*S2*S3) + (S1*S2*S3*S4)]. 
For example, if N1 is estimated to be in the age group of 60–64, then X1 would be 
the estimated number of retirees aged 60, S60*X1 would be the estimated number at age 
61, S60*S61*X1 would be is age 62, S60*S61*S62*X1 would be age 63, and 
S60*S61*S62*S63*X1 would be 64. 
Estimating the Annual Pension Benefit 
Based both on discussions with UAW officials and on general guidelines of benefits in 
the automobile industry, the annual pension benefit for each age group was estimated as 
listed below. 
Age 60–64 $22,000 
Age 65–69 $24,000 
Age 70–74 $29,000 
Age 75–79 $27,000 
Age 80–84 $25,000 
Age 85–89 $23,000 
Age 90–94 $21,000 
Age 95–99 $19,500 
Two primary factors were significant in determining these estimates. Generally, 
pension benefits track with annual earnings, and it is estimated, conservatively, that 
benefits in the auto industry were growing at an average annual rate of approximately 2.5 
percent. Typically, the cost of the benefits package in the auto industry, on an hourly 
basis, tends to be a consistent proportion of the hourly wage. Under the current 
negotiations for a new contract, it was reported that a Ford employee in the United States 
earns $28 per hour in wages with a total cost, including benefits and taxes, of $64 per 
hour (McDonald and Juan 2012). For those who were of an age approaching retirement, it 
is estimated that annual benefits were growing. For those already retired, it is estimated 
that annual benefits were smaller in proportion to those entering the pool of retirees. The 
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growth factor used for these estimates is 2.5 percent, consistent with average annual 
growth in earnings. 
For 2012, the annual amount of pension benefits entering the Anderson, Indiana, 
community was determined by multiplying the annual pension benefit estimate for each 
age by the estimated number of retirees at each age and then summing over all ages. For 
each subsequent year, the number of retirees at each age group was adjusted based on the 
weighted average of survival probabilities as provided by the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (2012). With this approach, the total amount of benefits entering the 
Anderson economy was estimated over the years 2012 through 2052.  
Estimating the Total Impact of Pension Benefits 
The economic impact includes a multiplier effect derived from spending resulting from 
pension benefits. For this part of the analysis, IMPLAN multipliers from the 2009 
database were adapted to the pension benefits as transfer payments entering the local 
economy. The IMPLAN model is a widely accepted and utilized input-output model for 
regional economic analysis. The model accounts for all dollar flows between the different 
sectors of the regional (Anderson, Indiana) economy. Using the information in the 
IMPLAN model, the way a dollar injected or removed from one sector (such as retiree 
pension incomes) is spent and then re-spent in other sectors of the regional economy and 
generates waves of economic activity, or the so-called multiplier effect, is estimated. 
There has been a considerable and lengthy discussion in the literature regarding the 
precision of the multipliers derived from this input-output model (Charney and Leones 
1997; Rickman and Schwer 1995). The primary advantages are that IMPLAN provides 
multipliers that are county-specific within a state and that the widespread application and 
acceptance of this particular model lends added credibility to the estimates. The primary 
disadvantage is that the model is designed to focus on industry sectors and not on transfer 
payments as a source of income. Consequently, several sectors relevant to Anderson, 
Indiana, were examined and an average was used in this analysis. 
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
As retirees expire over time, the net result is that the total of the pension benefits that 
enter the Anderson economy diminishes. The results are summarized in Figure 1.  
Presently, approximately $250 million enters the Anderson economy because of 
GM pension benefits. This will continue to decline as retirees expire, such that by 2032, 
the annual revenues entering the Anderson community will approach $50 million. These 
annual revenues will continue to decline until approximately 2052. 
These revenues will have indirect effects resulting in labor incomes as well as 
outputs in real goods and services derived from these revenues. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate 
the impact on labor income and on the local economy derived from pension income. 
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Figure 1. Annual Pension Benefits Entering the Anderson Economy with 10,000–
14,000 Current Pension Beneficiaries 
 
Table 1. Multiplier Effects of GM Pension Incomes on the Anderson Economy with 
10,000 Retirees 
Year 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Employment 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Labor 
Income 
($000s) 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
GDP 
($000s) 
Total 
Effect 
on GDP 
($000s) 
2014 968 $28,342 $126,311 $396,720 
2015 924 $27,135 $120,547 $378,614 
2016 880 $25,852 $114,851 $360,724 
2017 837 $24,590 $109,243 $343,111 
2018 795 $23,345 $103,714 $325,744 
2019 753 $22,117 $98,257 $308,606 
2020 712 $20,905 $92,872 $291,692 
2021 671 $19,723 $87,619 $275,194 
2022 632 $18,554 $82,427 $258,886 
Concluded next page 
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Table 1. Multiplier Effects of GM Pension Incomes on the Anderson Economy with 
10,000 Retirees, concl. 
Year 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Employment 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Labor 
Income 
($000s) 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
GDP 
($000s) 
Total 
Effect 
on GDP 
($000s) 
2024 554 $16,271 $72,284 $227,031 
2025 516 $15,163 $67,361 $211,569 
2026 479 $14,075 $62,531 $196,397 
2027 443 $13,018 $57,835 $181,649 
2028 408 $11,993 $53,282 $167,347 
2029 375 $11,002 $48,877 $153,513 
2030 342 $10,046 $44,628 $140,167 
2031 311 $9,126 $40,543 $127,337 
2032 281 $8,245 $36,629 $115,044 
2033 252 $7,404 $32,894 $103,341 
2034 225 $6,606 $29,346 $92,171 
2035 199 $5,851 $25,993 $81,638 
2036 175 $5,142 $22,844 $71,747 
2037 153 $4,480 $19,903 $62,510 
2038 132 $3,866 $17,176 $53,947 
2039 112 $3,302 $14,669 $46,071 
2040 95 $2,787 $12,383 $38,893 
2041 79 $2,323 $10,319 $32,409 
2042 65 $1,908 $8,478 $26,626 
2043 53 $1,543 $6,856 $21,535 
2044 42 $1,227 $5,450 $17,117 
2045 33 $956 $4,249 $13,345 
2046 25 $731 $3,248 $10,201 
2047 19 $546 $2,424 $7,614 
2048 14 $397 $1,762 $5,534 
2049 10 $281 $1,248 $3,919 
2050 6 $190 $845 $2,655 
2051 4 $123 $544 $1,710 
2052 3 $74 $327 $1,027 
2053 1 $39 $174 $548 
2054 1 $16 $70 $220 
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Table 2. Multiplier Effects of GM Pension Incomes on the Anderson Economy with 
14,000 Retirees 
Year 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Employment 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Labor Income 
($000s) 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
GDP 
($000s) 
Total 
Effect on 
GDP 
($000s) 
2014 1355 $39,679 $176,835 $555,408 
2015 1294 $37,989 $168,766 $530,060 
2016 1232 $36,193 $160,791 $505,014 
2017 1172 $34,426 $152,940 $480,355 
2018 1113 $32,683 $145,200 $456,042 
2019 1054 $30,964 $137,560 $432,048 
2020 997 $29,267 $130,021 $408,369 
2021 939 $27,612 $122,667 $385,272 
2022 885 $25,976 $115,398 $362,440 
2023 829 $24,363 $108,234 $339,944 
2024 776 $22,779 $101,198 $317,843 
2025 722 $21,228 $94,305 $296,197 
2026 671 $19,705 $87,543 $274,956 
2027 620 $18,225 $80,969 $254,309 
2028 571 $16,790 $74,595 $234,286 
2029 525 $15,403 $68,428 $214,918 
2030 479 $14,064 $62,479 $196,234 
2031 435 $12,776 $56,760 $178,272 
2032 393 $11,543 $51,281 $161,062 
2033 353 $10,366 $46,052 $144,677 
2034 315 $9,248 $41,084 $129,039 
2035 279 $8,191 $36,390 $114,293 
2036 245 $7,199 $31,982 $100,446 
2037 214 $6,272 $27,864 $87,514 
2038 185 $5,412 $24,046 $75,526 
2039 157 $4,623 $20,537 $64,499 
2040 133 $3,902 $17,336 $54,450 
2041 111 $3,252 $14,447 $45,373 
2042 91 $2,671 $11,869 $37,276 
2043 74 $2,160 $9,598 $30,149 
2044 59 $1,718 $7,630 $23,964 
2045 46 $1,338 $5,949 $18,683 
2046 35 $1,023 $4,547 $14,281 
Concluded next page 
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Table 2. Multiplier Effects of GM Pension Incomes on the Anderson Economy with 
14,000 Retirees, concl. 
Year 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Employment 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
Labor Income 
($000s) 
Indirect & 
Induced 
Effect on 
GDP 
($000s) 
Total 
Effect on 
GDP 
($000s) 
2048 20 $556 $2,467 $7,748 
2049 14 $393 $1,747 $5,487 
2050 8 $266 $1,183 $3,717 
2051 6 $172 $762 $2,394 
2052 4 $104 $458 $1,438 
2053 1 $55 $244 $767 
2054 1 $22 $98 $308 
CONCLUSIONS 
The pension benefits of retired GM employees are an important economic resource, not 
only for those households receiving pension benefits but also for the general economy of 
Anderson, Indiana. It is estimated that the immediate impact of those pensions injects 
between $250 million and $340 million into the Anderson community. The impact is 
more substantial when the multiplier effect on the economy, which currently supports 
between 968 and 1,355 full-time-equivalent jobs that generate between $28 million and 
$40 million in labor income, is considered. The total effect currently on the Anderson 
economy is between $397 million and $555 million. The pension benefits will continue to 
inject resources into the Anderson economy over time, although at a declining rate as 
pensioners move or expire, for an additional 40 years. 
As part of the chapter 11 bankruptcy agreement, General Motors has positioned 
the “old” pension benefits in a division that could easily be bankrupt. A bankruptcy of the 
“old GM” would place the pension benefits under the directive of PBGC. There are 
therefore three potential scenarios to consider if a bankruptcy were to occur. 
The first scenario is that there would be no change in the stream of pension 
benefits. PBGC sets a maximum benefit each year under ERISA, and this amount is fixed 
as of the date the pension sponsor, in this case GM, would enter bankruptcy. For 2013, 
the maximum guarantee is $4,789.77 per month, or $57,477.24 per year. This amount is 
well above the range of pension benefits created prior to 2006 at the GM plants in 
Anderson. If PBGC is able to meet its obligations, the pensions would be protected under 
the provisions of ERISA of 1974. 
The second scenario relies on the history of PBGC. In the past, PBGC has 
reduced pension benefits after a close analysis and evaluation of the specific provisions 
under ERISA. This could result in some pensions being adjusted. Historically, these 
86  Journal of the Indiana Academy of the Social Sciences Vol. 18 (2015) 
adjustments have been in the range of approximately a 20% reduction. Considering the 
financial situation at PBGC, this is a viable threat, and if pension benefits were reduced 
20 percent, the economic impact would be proportional—that is, an immediate reduction 
in pension revenues between $50 million and $68 million, the loss of 194 to 271 full-
time-equivalent jobs, resulting in a loss of $5.6 million to $8 million in labor income, and 
a total impact on the Anderson economy in the range of $79 million to $111 million. 
The third scenario questions the solvency of PBGC. The Pension Protection Act 
of 2006 (PPA) was intended to resolve the funding deficit experienced by the PBGC due 
to past plan terminations. The PBGC continues to experience a funding deficit crisis and 
is deeply and dangerously in debt. In the PBGC (2014) actuarial report for single-
employer pension programs like the GM pension plan, the PBGC liability as of 
September 30, 2014, was $102.6 billion for 4,640 that have terminated and $0.76 billion 
for two probable plan terminations. If the PBGC is unable to meet its obligations, the 
policies and directives under ERISA would likely change. The worst case scenario is that 
PBGC would be unable to meet its obligations at all. The projected loss is the impact 
reported in the analysis above. 
The consequences of a pension plan failure can be devastating to the pensioners, 
particularly when the PBGC is unable to meet financial obligations and when severe 
cutbacks in benefits occur. The impact on the economy of the community—in this case 
Anderson, Indiana—is equally significant, as the analysis indicates. Similar risks of plan 
failures could occur for numerous pensioners and communities, and the financial 
difficulties of the PBGC could result in significant adjustments in pension benefits, 
affecting pensioners and also the communities. 
It remains to be seen as corporate America continues to default on its pension 
obligations if communities like Anderson will be able to prosper as they did in the past. 
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